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ABSTRACT
What is the role of foreign currency debt in precipitating financial crises? In this paper we compare
the 1880 to 1913 period to recent experience. We examine debt crises, currency crises, banking
crises and the interrelation between these varieties of crises. We pay special attention to the role of
hard currency debt, currency mismatches and debt intolerance. We find fairly robust evidence that
high exposure to foreign currency debt does not necessarily lead to a high chance of having a debt
crisis, currency crisis, or a banking crisis. A key finding is some countries do not suffer from great
financial fragility despite high exposure to original sin. In the nineteenth century, the British
offshoots and Scandinavia generally avoided severe financial meltdowns while today many advanced
countries have high original sin but have had few financial crises. The common denominator in both
periods is that currency mismatches matter. A strong reserve position or high exports relative to hard
currency liabilities helps decrease the likelihood of a debt crisis, currency crisis or a banking crisis.
This strengthens the evidence for the hypothesis that foreign currency debt is dangerous when mis-
managed. We discuss the robustness of these results and make some general comparisons based on
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What  is  the  role  of  foreign  currency  debt  in  precipitating  financial  crises?  In  this  paper  we 
compare the 1880 to 1913 period to recent experience. We examine debt crises, currency crises, 
banking crises and the interrelation between these varieties of crises. We pay special attention to 
the role of hard currency debt, currency mismatches and debt intolerance. We find fairly robust 
evidence that high exposure to foreign currency debt does not necessarily lead to a high chance of 
having a debt crisis, currency crisis, or a banking crisis. A key finding is some countries do not 
suffer  from  great  financial  fragility  despite  high  exposure  to  original  sin.  In  the  nineteenth 
century,  the  British  offshoots  and  Scandinavia  generally  avoided  severe  financial  meltdowns 
while today many advanced countries have high original sin but have had few financial crises. 
The common denominator in both periods is that currency mismatches matter. A strong reserve 
position or high exports relative to hard currency liabilities helps decrease the likelihood of a debt 
crisis, currency crisis or a banking crisis. This strengthens the evidence for the hypothesis that 
foreign currency debt is dangerous when mis-managed. We discuss the robustness of these results 
and  make  some  general  comparisons  based  on  this  evidence  from  over  60  years  of  intense 





  The period from 1870-1913 was a period of globalization in both goods and 
financial markets comparable to the present era of globalization. It was also a period 
rife with emerging market financial crises with great resonance for the experience that 
we have observed in the past decade. In both eras many emerging countries faced 
frequent currency crises, banking crises and twin crises. They also faced a number of 
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debt crises coming on the heels of banking and currency trouble. In both periods 
many of these countries suffered from what Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) refer 
to  as  original  sin.  The  external  debt  that  they  accumulated  to  finance  their 
development was almost strictly denominated in foreign currency or in terms of gold 
(or  had  gold  clauses)  before  1914,  just  as  emerging  market  debt  today  is  almost 
entirely denominated in dollars, euros or yen. When the exchange rate depreciates, 
debt service in gold or foreign currency becomes very difficult leading to an increased 
likelihood of default, the consequent drying up of external funding and economic 
collapse. 
  The emerging country experience stands in contrast to that of the advanced 
core countries which are financially mature, have credibility and either issue bonds 
denominated in terms of their own currency or manage their significant hard currency 
debt carefully.  There were few crises in these countries. This leads us to wonder 
whether these debt structures might play a role in explaining the difference in crisis 
incidence.  We  also  investigate  whether  balance  sheet  mismatches  as  discussed  in 
Goldstein  and  Turner  (2004)  mattered.  Finally  we  also  examine  whether  poor 
reputation and accumulated  default experience was  a problem as  hypothesized by 
Carmen Reinhart, Kenneth Rogoff and Miguel Savastano (2003) in their work on debt 
intolerance. 
  We have developed a database to allow us to identify and distinguish original 
sin and balance sheet crises from more traditional currency and banking crises for 
roughly  30 countries (both advanced  and emerging) from  1880-1913 and  over 40 
countries between 1972 and 1997 the post-Bretton Woods period. We have data both 
on  type  of  crisis  incidence  and  on  the  fundamentals  that  economists  believe  are 
determinants of crises. A caveat worth keeping in mind is that the original sin data 
and  our  mismatch  data  especially  in  the  recent  period  are  highly  incomplete  and 
researchers still lack the coverage necessary to make definitive conclusions. Our data 
set then is somewhat unique in that the coverage and quality of the available data 
from 100 years ago are somewhat better than contemporary data. Nevertheless, we 
use the data of limited quality to estimate the probability of having a particular type of 
crisis  using standard pooled  probit  models  so  as to  show the correlation between 
original sin, mismatch and financial crises. 
  Our results do not find unambiguous support for the idea that hard currency 
debt is always associated with more financial turbulence. Good financial management  
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of the original sin condition, strong financial development and agile responsiveness to 
crises  seem  to  play  a  role  in  helping  avoid  crises.  In  fact,  we  find  evidence that 
countries  with  significant  or  full-blown  original  sin  can  be  divided  into  two  sub-
groups. For example in the pre-1914 period, one group includes countries such as 
Argentina,  Brazil,  Chile,  Italy  and  Portugal  each  of  which  suffered  a  financial 
catastrophe between 1880 and 1913. The other group, including Australia, Canada, 
New Zealand, Norway, and the US had relatively little trouble with financial crises in 
terms of frequency or virulence. 
We argue that today countries like Greece, Ireland, Israel, Spain, Sweden, and 
Singapore look similar to the latter set. On the other hand, countries like Argentina, 
Malaysia,  Thailand,  Indonesia  and  Brazil  which  suffer  from  financial  fragility, 
manifested by more frequent and more encompassing crises, look like the former set 
of the nineteenth century. Today, measured original sin in both groups of countries is 
high, but crisis incidence has been much lower in the first set of countries.  
We ascribe this partially to good debt management or avoidance of currency 
mismatches  on  the  aggregate  balance  sheet  and  partially  to  special  country 
characteristics  that  vary  over  time  and  are  most  difficult  to  control  for 
econometrically. The latter group of countries do not seem to possess either of these 
strengths. We also argue there are two other sets of countries. One consists of the 
most  peripheral  regions.  These  suffer  from  original  sin,  but  they  are  closed  to 
international capital flows and hence have been more successful at avoiding crises. 
The other includes the most advanced economies without original sin, strong financial 
systems and infrequent currency and debt crises. 
 This is a more extensive categorization than simply core versus periphery or 
industrialized vs. emerging market. It also highlights the fact that original sin is not 
always associated with financial crises. Some countries are able to avoid the vicious 
cycle of exchange rate depreciation and balance sheet deterioration that often leads to 
financial catastrophe. Others seem unable to do so. Some countries are financially 
robust while others are overwhelmingly vulnerable. This categorization seems to be 
evident in the two historically distinct periods of financial globalization. It moves us 
closer to understanding which country characteristics interact with original sin so as to 
produce  financial  fragility.  Conditioning  on  observables  and  allowing  for 
unobservable heterogeneity in the ability to deal with and withstand crises leads us to 
the conclusion that there is substantial evidence that careful debt management matters  
 
4 
when original sin is a fact of life. When countries match their hard currency liabilities 
with hard currency reserves or take out such debt in proportion to their export earning 
potential, they reduce their exposure to currency and banking crises which often can 
spill over into debt crises in the presence of balance sheet effects. Finally we sound a 
note of caution. Since many of our comparative results are based on data that are 
limited  in  coverage  and  different  in  scope,  we  discuss  the  vital  need  for  further 




2.  History, Financial Crises, Balance Sheets and Hard Currency Debt 
   
   
   In this paper we view banking trouble, currency crises and debt crises that 
occur in the same or consecutive years as inter-related phenomena. This is different 
from first generation currency crisis models that viewed them as events arising from 
unsustainable fiscal policy under a pegged exchange rate. It is also different from a 
strand of the literature which views banking crises as arising uniquely from poor 
supervision, weak structure or stochastic liquidity runs. Our view is that while some 
countries had crises that unfolded in ways the older generation of models would 
predict, other countries faced financial meltdown by having twin (banking and 
currency crises) or even triple crises, where in addition to a large depreciation and 
disruption in the banking sector sovereign debt went into default. 
 One important factor determining the ultimate outcome may be an interaction 
between the nature of the debt contracts in place and the robustness of the financial 
system. Our framework for thinking about financial crises is very much parallel to 
that enunciated in Mishkin (2003) which in turn is inspired by an open-economy 
approach to the credit channel transmission mechanism of monetary policy. Balance 
sheets, net worth and informational asymmetries are key ingredients in this type of a 
model. 
Initial trouble might begin in the banking sector for a number of reasons. One 
possibility is that international interest rates rise. This worsens the balance sheets of 
non-financial firms and banks alike. As the number of non-performing loans rises and 
net worth falls, a decline in lending can occur contributing further to output losses. At 
this point, internationally mobile capital may take a decidedly pessimistic view of  
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returns in the debtor country and either stop coming in (a sudden stop) or reverse 
itself leaving significant short-term financing gaps. 
This reversal leads to more trouble in the financial sector and increased stress 
for non-financial firms which are forced to cut investment because of the lack of 
financing. Governments may have trouble making interest payments on debt coming 
due as capital markets become unwilling to continue rolling debt over. The capital 
flow reversal, if large enough, could also force the abandonment of an exchange rate 
peg and a large change in the nominal exchange rate. Floating regimes could also see 
large depreciation occur under such a scenario. 
A view inspired by the events of the late 1990s regarding the impact of such 
exchange rate changes is that they may be contractionary.
1 This is where original sin 
enters the picture. Since the majority of obligations for nearly all countries are in 
foreign currency or, in the late nineteenth century, denominated in terms of a fixed 
amount of gold, depreciation vis-à-vis creditor countries or breaking the link between 
gold and the domestic currency could lead to increases in the real value of debt. This 
is a redistribution of wealth from domestic borrowers to their creditors who are 
expecting a certain amount of gold or foreign currency.
2 When net worth matters for 
lending decisions, this decline in the net worth of  debtors can lead to another round 
of “disintermediation” causing widespread bankruptcies due to liquidity problems. All 
else equal, the deterioration to debtors’ balance sheets would be more severe the 
greater the amount of fixed interest rate hard currency debt outstanding.  
There is some contention in the literature as to whether all is in fact equal. 
Goldstein and Turner (2003) have argued that often countries insure themselves 
against exchange rate movements. Hard currency debt can be backed up by hard 
currency assets. Alternatively, countries could have enough export capacity to offset 
changes in liabilities due to exchange rate swings. To gauge the actual effect of 
original sin one must take account of the mismatch position or the entire balance sheet 
                                                            
1 Theoretical work by Céspedes, Chang and Velasco (2004) demonstrates how under certain very 
plausible circumstances original sin can lead to contractionary depreciations. They also point out that 
multiple factors matter for how depreciations interact with economic fluctuations. These are: the level 
of original sin, the level of indebtedness, openness to trade and the degree of financial friction. Their 
theoretical model divides countries into a financially robust region and a financially vulnerable region. 
The latter experience contractionary depreciations. 
2 Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza (2003) argue that what matters is the aggregate external 
mismatch and if all debt is domestic, that one sector’s losses are the others’ gains. Our view however is 
that net worth matters. When a debtor’s net worth deteriorates, borrowing capacity falls, and the capital 
markets seize up. This is one reason why we should focus on domestic and external hard currency debt 
rather than just foreign holdings (or issues) of hard currency debt.   
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position of an economy. We describe how we do this below. Moreover, Reinhart, 
Rogoff and Savastano (2003) have argued that original sin is a proxy for a weak 
financial system and poor fiscal control. As we describe below, we control for some 
of these fundamentals too, allowing for a test of this competing hypothesis.  
 
 
 2.1 The Role of Original Sin 
 
  It  has  been  the  case  since  at  least  the  18
th  century  that  debt  issued  on 
international capital markets has been denominated in the currency of the market of 
issue and not the currency of the issuing country. In fact a large amount of locally 
issued debt was payable in a fixed amount of gold and today is indexed or made 
payable in foreign currencies. It has also long been noted that such debt can become 
more onerous to repay in the face of depreciations, and that since emerging markets 
often  face  rapid  exchange  rate  depreciations  associated  with  sudden  stops  and 
reversals of capital inflows or very loose monetary policy, these countries are more 
often the victims of such a volatile combination.  
Over the last ten years, these phenomena have started to be addressed in the 
economics literature. Eichengreen and Hausmann (1997) argued that the danger of 
exchange rate fluctuations in the face of foreign currency borrowing might oblige 
many countries to adopt hard currency  pegs.  They  coined  the  term “original sin” 
because they argued foreign currency denominated debt was imposed by international 
capital  markets.  Nations  with  poor  reputations,  and  even  nations  with  good 
reputations  or  solid  fundamentals,  are  obliged  to  issue  debt  in  key  international 
currencies. In other words, domestic policies or problems were not the only reason 
countries could not borrow in their own currencies. Because of “original sin” and the 
problems  that  could  be  generated  in  the  face  of  a  devaluation,  Eichengreen  and 
Hausmann (1999) argued that exchange rate policy was of the utmost importance 
even for those countries where fundamentals and fiscal policies were sound but which 
might fall victim to a liquidity run. 
  One key controversy remains. Exactly how harmful is original sin? Early work 
by Eichengreen and Hausmann used mainly anecdotal evidence both on the incidence 
of original sin and its effects. Very recent work by the same authors along with Ugo 
Panizza (Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza 2005) has shown that countries with  
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higher original sin have higher exchange rate volatility and higher macroeconomic 
volatility.  Flandreau  (2003)  argues  that  in  the  nineteenth  century  depreciation 
increased the debt burden because of original sin which led to sovereign debt crises. 
He illustrates this with reference to several cases. But we are unaware of any work 
which has attempted to find a systematic empirical association between original sin 
and financial crises either in the past or for the period between 1972 and 1997.
3  
For the historical period, we collected data from various national sources on 
hard currency debt and augmented and compared this with data made available by 
Flandreau and Zúmer (2004). What we refer to as hard currency debt is debt that 
carried a gold clause or was made payable at a fixed rate in a foreign currency.
4 Our 
measure of original sin is the ratio of this quantity to total public debt outstanding.  
This measure is different from the measure we use for the 1972-1997 period. 
For this period we use the measure of original sin defined in Eichengreen Hausmann, 
and Panizza (2005). This measure of international original sin for country i based on 
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5  
We must be clear that there is a potential problem in the original sin data.  It is 
only available for the period 1993-1997. We calculate the within country average of 
the observations available. We then use this average value for all the years in which a 
country  appears  in  the  data  set.  This  broadens  the  time  span  of  our  sample,  but 
obviously  creates  some  measurement  error  in  our  key  explanatory  variable  and 
complicates any “within-style” regressions. We are confident that the bias imparted is 
                                                            
3 Our conclusions differ from Flandreau’s as we take on a wider set of hypotheses and cases. Empirical 
work by Flandreau and Zúmer (2004) which regresses sovereign bond yields on a ratio of interest 
service to government revenues and a number of other variables also argues that hard currency or gold 
debt was dangerous. Their tests are quite different from ours since our dependent variables are debt 
crises, banking crises, or currency crises. Frankel and Rose (1996) examined “currency crashes,” 
external debt and exchange rate fluctuations, but their approach to measuring original sin, its impact 
and the type of crises considered is different than ours. Specifically, they look at the transmission of 
shocks from the core through the interest rate on foreign currency debt. 
4 The data appendix from Bordo and Meissner (forthcoming) has more to say about the structure of this 
debt. Flandreau and Zúmer (2004) highlight just some of the difficulties in defining this type of debt. 
Italian bonds for example had de facto gold clauses for foreigners but not for residents, but de jure gold 
clauses for both classes of creditors for a certain proportion of the debt. Likewise, Spain arbitrarily 
implemented a residency distinction for manner of repayment around 1900. US debt was sometimes 
vague ex ante about the terms of repayment and often repayment was promised “in specie”. Mostly this 
was meant to be gold but could have meant silver which secularly depreciated against gold after 1873. 
Still our measure is at least a good proxy for the variable of interest. 
5 For the 1972-1997 period this measure runs from  0 to 100 while for the historical period it is based 
on the 0 to 1 scale.  
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not too severe. This relies on the fact that original sin is extremely slow to move over 
time and for most countries it does not move from 100 over the observation period. 
Figures below show this country by country and qualitative evidence by Eichengreen 
et. al. make this assertion seem reasonable.
6  
One key difference between markets today and in the nineteenth century is 
that recently debt has been issued in quite a few small country currencies by agents 
from  leading  countries  allowing  opportunities  for  debt  swaps.  That  is,  for  some 
countries,  the  numerator  and  the  denominator  in  the  difference  term  differ 
substantially because many other countries issue debt in their currency. To the best of 
our knowledge it does not appear that foreigners pre-1914 were issuing debt in other 
exotic currencies. In the pre-1914 case, original sin was not reduced through swaps 
(Flandreau  2003  p.  20)  hence  we  can  restrict  attention  in  the  numerator  of  this 
expression  to  securities  issued  in  local  currency  (without  gold  clauses)  only  by 
residents.  
The  other  key  difference  between  our  nineteenth  century  measure  and  the 
contemporary measure that we use is that in the historical period we look at debt 
issued in domestic and international markets instead of looking only at international 
issues. One reason we view this as important is because many domestic issues of the 
day carried gold clauses. As described above, in the case where monetary authorities 
devalued the local currency in terms of gold this would have an effect similar to a 
depreciation  when a  country  had foreign currency debt.  In either  event, real  debt 
repayments for local currency gold clause debt and for foreign currency debt would 
both increase.
7 Hence, in the early period we do not classify debt as “debt issued in 
(local) currency i" if it contained a “gold clause” stipulating a fixed quantity of gold 
per unit of local currency payable. Only debt payable in local paper currency, without 
mention  of  the  gold-local  currency  exchange  rate  upon  payment  of  coupons  and 
principal, is included in the ratio above. The latter period data leaves out domestically 
issued debt.  
                                                            
6 Australia, Canada and South Africa saw large declines in their original sin measures over the 1980s. 
Because of this we understate their measures in the 1970s. In the econometrics this is likely to lead to 
slight upward bias of the positive effect of original sin on crisis incidence since these countries had few 
crises but actually had high original sin. 
7 We are finessing the question of what happens to the real exchange rate and prices in general. We 
assume here that nominal depreciations are equivalent to real depreciations in the short-run perhaps 
because of sticky prices. On the domestic side, we assume going off gold or a depreciation implies a 
depreciation of the local currency versus gold and domestic prices are constant over the short run.   
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The question then arises of how related our measures are in the two periods, 
and  this  hinges  on  how  domestic  original  sin  relates  to international  original  sin. 
Unfortunately there is not much data available to answer this question. Eichengreen, 
Hausman and Panizza (2003) collected data for two dozen countries and show that in 
several of these, domestic original sin diverges distinctly from the level of original 
sin. But for the most part, original sin and domestic original sin are highly correlated 
and so we are comfortable using the international measure.
8 
Figure 1 shows the ratio of hard currency government debt to total government 
debt by country between 1880 and 1913.  Our time series plots reveal most countries’ 
measure of original sin to be fairly constant over time. Some countries’ situations 
“worsened”.  In  the  nineteenth  century,  Japan  became  more  exposed  to  foreign 
currency debt as it entered global capital markets from the late 1890s. Argentina and 
Brazil converted local currency paper debt into gold clause debt in the 1890s. Only 
Spain and Italy appear to have decidedly decreased their reliance on hard currency 
debt relative to internal currency debt. These nations often had floating currencies 
throughout the period. As noted by Flandreau and Sussman (2005), their situations 
appear similar to those of Russia and Austria-Hungary, countries which had relatively 
low degrees of original sin and which also had floating currencies over most of the 
period we cover. These are the counter-examples to those who believe that poor fiscal 
history,  a  shaky  exchange  rate  policy  and  economic  backwardness  are  causes  of 
original sin. Nearly all of these countries had previous episodes of debt default and 
chronically poor fiscal situations.  
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the original sin measure for various countries 
between 1993 and 1997. We also see the strong persistence in the original sin measure 
over these five years. Only Denmark, New Zealand and South Africa seem to have 
large  changes  in  original  sin  while  a  few  other  developed  countries  have  mild 
changes. The less developed countries and the emerging markets seem to have little 
change. 
   Figure 3 shows the long-run averages in the nineteenth century of our original 
sin  measure.  This  also  reveals  a  counterintuitive  ranking,  but  is  consistent  with 
previous findings by Flandreau and Sussman (2005) and Eichengreen, Hausmann and 
                                                            
8 The share of each kind of debt (domestic and external issues) will also obviously matter. This could 
be one reason why we find that more developed countries with larger pools of domestic savings and 
larger domestic debt markets are able to deal with measures of original sin that are quite high.   
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Panizza (2005). Financial centers have less original sin. Small peripheral countries 
have a lot of original sin. Countries with ostensibly rotten fiscal institutions and poor 
international track records have intermediate levels of original sin. Notice that Spain, 
Russia, Austria-Hungary, Italy and Argentina are all towards the lower middle of the 
spectrum. However, some countries with sound fiscal, financial and monetary records, 
like Denmark and Sweden also fall into this range. These countries, had financial 
institutions that were evolving in the same direction as the core.
9 
  Figure  4  displays  the  1993-1997  within  country  averages  of  original  sin. 
Again,  a  counter-intuitive  ranking  comes  forth  if  one  believes  that  poor  financial 
development and a lack of credibility matter for original sin. Amongst the countries 
with measures of original sin between 80 and 100, we see highly developed countries 
such as Belgium, Finland, Ireland, Singapore and Sweden. At the same time, nearly 
all emerging markets except perhaps South Africa also have high levels of original 
sin. Figures 3 and 4 then provoke the question: are fundamentals (both those directly 
observable  and  those  that  are  less  easy  to  systematically  operationalize)  more 
important for explaining crisis incidence than the actual level of hard currency debt or 
original sin?  
 
2.2 Currency Mismatches   
 
  Goldstein and Turner (2004) have argued that currency “mismatches” are the 
main  potential  problem  with  foreign  currency  debt.  Countries  that  have  foreign 
currency liabilities which are not offset by foreign currency assets may be more likely 
than  countries  with  more  foreign  assets  to  find  it  difficult  to  repay  their  foreign 
currency debts in the event of a depreciation. On the margin, changes in the exchange 
rate can become a problem the greater the mismatch as local currency assets lose 
value  in  terms  of  the  foreign  liabilities.  Goldstein  and  Turner  have  three  key 
ingredients  to  their  overall  measure  of  a  nation’s  mismatch.  They  first  use  the 
difference  between  all  reported  foreign  assets  and  foreign  currency  liabilities 
outstanding. They then divide this measure by exports (or imports if the difference is 
                                                            
9 In Bordo and Meissner (2005) we discuss the qualitative and historical evidence on the evolution of 
original sin and present several case studies of crisis experiences.  
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positive)  to  account  for  openness  to  trade.
10  For  example,  (when  positive)  the 
mismatch decreases with exports because a depreciation would likely attract a larger 
amount of extra foreign currency  resources available to the domestic economy and 
thus such a country would be more naturally hedged. Finally they pre-multiply this 
ratio by the ratio of all reported foreign currency liabilities to all reported liabilities 
outstanding.  
Data  on  government  and  non-government  foreign  assets  is  difficult  to 
assemble  today  and  probably  impossible  for  the  pre-World  War  I  era.  In  the 
nineteenth century, we focus  on the government’s mismatch and believe this  is a 
relatively  good  proxy  for  the  economy-wide  mismatch.  The  functional  form  we 
choose  is  different  from  Goldstein  and  Turner and  slightly  closer  to  that  used  in 
Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza (2003).
11 For country i  we have 
 
.    
exports
  reserves   nal internatio - g outstandin debt  currency     hard   total
Mismatchi =  
 
For the nineteenth century, our measure of reserves usually only includes gold 
reserves held at the central bank, in the banking system or held by the government 
treasury. The sources are listed in the appendix to Bordo and Meissner (2005). For 
the twentieth century we use international reserves as given in data underlying 
Bordo et. al. (2001). 
 For the twentieth century, we use the total of external debt given in the World 
Bank’s Global Development Finance or the level of external debt given by the IMF’s 
International  Financial  Statistics  for  countries  not  listed  in  the  former.  For  the 
nineteenth  century,  total  hard  currency  debt  (domestic and  international  issues)  is 
                                                            
10 Goldstein and Turner choose a functional form so that the boost to exports from a depreciation 
improves a nation’s balance sheet. Though the Goldstein and Turner metric (and our version of theirs) 
is one measure of the balance sheet position, it is not the ideal measure of a nation’s balance sheet. 
There are omitted ingredients that could make a difference to the balance sheet. For example, for this 
period, one could theoretically refine this measure by including foreign currency and gold revenues 
collected through tariffs, and perhaps foreign assets held in banks.  Most of these data would be 
impossible to collect for a reasonable number of observations. Functional form is also something for 
future research. For comparability we choose a measure as close to the Goldstein and Turner form as 
possible. 
11 Eichengreen Hausmann and Panizza (2003) report that the correlation between their measure of 
mismatch and the Goldstein and Turner measure is 0.82.  
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calculated directly if the data is available or by multiplying the total debt outstanding 
by the percentage of total debt that is payable in gold or foreign currencies.
12  A 
priori, a higher mismatch measure should be correlated with more financial crises. As 
such it compares with the Goldstein and Turner measure. Nevertheless, it does take a 
slightly different functional form and potentially does leave out a significant fraction 
of total assets and liabilities in the economy. The median of our twentieth century 
mismatch measure is 0.95 with a standard deviation of 1.3. In the nineteenth century 
the values are 0.79 and 2.66. 
 
 
2.3 Debt Intolerance 
    
A new literature on sovereign financial difficulties has emphasized the role of 
past defaults in creating current difficulties. Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003) 
(RRS) have coined the term debt intolerance. This line of research tries to explain 
why some countries are able to sustain very high debt to GDP ratios while other 
emerging market countries run into debt problems with comparatively low debt to 
GDP  ratios.  Their  evidence  suggests  that  past  defaults  generate  poor  sovereign 
ratings.  Countries  with worse  track  records  in  international  capital  markets  suffer 
greater financial fragility due to increased borrowing costs at a given level of debt to 
GDP.  An  alternative  view  might  be  that  default  history  or  sovereign  ratings  are 
proxies for other underlying structural or institutional problems. Hence we would also 
like to control for such fundamentals, as far as possible, to allow for the possibility of 
graduation from debt intolerance. 
  Given  these  hypotheses,  we  would  like  our  tests  to  include  a  measure  of 
default  history.  For  the  nineteenth  century  sample,  we  interact  a  public  debt  to 
government revenue ratio with an indicator variable that equals one if a country had at 
least one default episode between 1800 and 1880. In the twentieth century sample our 
debt sustainability measure changes to the debt to output ratio since output data is 
                                                            
12 Goldstein and Turner note that net worth increases with depreciation for net creditors. To get around 
the fact that an increase in the denominator of mismatch would decrease the mismatch measure for net 
creditors they divide by imports when assets exceed liabilities. For all of the results we present, we 
divide by exports. In our nineteenth century sample, we also tried dividing by imports when 
appropriate. The two measures have a correlation of 0.999. Our results do not change significantly in 
that sample when we divide by imports for those observations with positive numerators.  
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more reliable and our debt measures include more than just government debt. We 
interact this ratio with an indicator that equals one if there was a default in the country 
between 1824 and 1971. If the increase in the probability of a financial crisis for a 
marginal increase in the debt to revenue or debt to GDP ratio is larger for a peripheral 
country or a past defaulter, we would argue there is evidence in support of the debt 
intolerance hypothesis. 
 
2.4 Other Data and Hypotheses 
 
The literature on predicting financial crises with econometric techniques is 
abundant. Our approach is inspired by the pared down methodology of Frankel and 
Rose (1996) who looked at currency crashes at the annual level. Many subsequent 
papers  have  made  modifications  to  this  early  attempt  and  have  largely  been 
unsuccessful at accurately predicting any type of financial crisis with great accuracy.
13 
However, some approaches and explanatory variables have done reasonably well in 
predicting crises or at least being strongly and statistically significantly correlated 
with crises in a way consonant with priors based on economic theory.
14 
We attempt to control for the union of the variables from the extant literature 
that are applicable to the time period at hand. In parentheses we list the variable used 
in  the  1972-1997  period  if  it  varies  from  that  used  in  the  early  period.  The  list 
includes total outstanding government debt divided by government revenue (debt to 
GDP), growth in the terms of trade, the trade balance divided by nominal GDP, the 
domestic long-term interest rate, an indicator for whether the country maintained a 
gold standard (or a pegged exchange rate), growth of the money supply, the ratio of 
gold reserves in the banking system to notes in circulation (the ratio of reserves to 
M2), and the yield on British long-term bonds (the unweighted average of G7 long-
term  interest  rates).
15  The  variables  used  depend  on  which  type  of  crisis  we  are 
examining and are well indicated in the respective tables. Our sources, and definitions 
of these variables are located in the data appendix. 
                                                            
13 See Berg and Patillo (1999) for a broad comparison of some important papers in this literature. 
14 Glick and Hutchinson (2001) explore twin crises in emerging markets, and our methodology to 
gauge the interaction between banking, currency and debt crises in part resembles theirs. 
15 In previous work we used the deviation of the real exchange rate from the period average but this 
variable is rather ad hoc as it is not a real effective exchange rate. It was not terribly informative and 
there is a lack of data in the present period so we have dropped it.  
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  A complete list of the included countries for the basic specifications is also 
found in the data appendix. The specifications from the 1880-1913 sample include 
roughly 21 countries which were also examined in Bordo, Eichengreen, Klingebiel, 
and Martínez-Peria (2001). We have added information on crises and macro data for 
nine  other  countries.  These  new  additions  include  Austria-Hungary,  Egypt,  India, 
Mexico,  New  Zealand,  Russia,  South  Africa,  Turkey,  and  Uruguay.  However 
limitations  in  availability  of  the  macro  data  prevent  all  of  these  countries  from 
appearing in each and every specification. For the 1972-1997 sample, he number of 
countries  that  actually  appear  in  the  estimations  is  somewhat  counts  roughly  36 
countries in the typical econometric model. 
 
 
2.5 Crises, 1880-1913 
 
In  Figure  5  we  present  the  frequency  of  various  types  of  crises  (banking, 
currency, twin, debt, “third generation” crises and all types of crisis together).
16 This 
is the number of years a  country  was  in crisis divided by  total possible  years of 
observation.  We  use the country-year  as the unit of observation and eliminate all 
country-years  that  witness  ongoing  crises  from  the  denominator  (except  for  third 
generation crises where we do not eliminate ongoing banking and currency crises) to 
come up with a total number for years of observation. We see the pattern found in 
Bordo  et.  al.  (2001)  in  terms  of  the  relative  frequency  of  types  of  crises.  The 
predominant form of crises before 1914 were banking crises, followed by currency 
crises, twin and then debt crises.
17  
By  comparison,  the  most  recent  period  seems  much  more  crisis  prone 
measured in any of these several ways. Today the incidence of currency crises is quite 
high and debt crises accompanied by banking and/or currency crises are much more 
frequent although still quite uncommon overall.  
                                                            
16 Our crisis dates and the methodology we use to classify years of crisis are listed in the appendix. We 
define a crisis as “third generation” if there was a debt crisis accompanied by either a banking crisis 
(ongoing or in the first year) a currency crisis or both in the same or previous year. 
17 Debt crises were not demarcated by Bordo et al. (2001)  
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Figures 6, 7, 8 and 9 present scatter plots of the percentage of time a country 
was  in  a  crisis  episode  versus  our  measure  of  original  sin  and  our  mismatch 
variables.
18 In the pre-World War I era, there appears to be an inverse U relationship 
between debt crises and original sin. Countries with intermediate ranges of original 
sin seem to take longer to resolve their debt crises than those at either end of the 
spectrum. No such pattern is evident in the latest period. In fact there appears to be a 
direct positive relationship between the severity of debt crises and the average level of 
original sin and similarly for currency and banking crises. But still there is a much 
larger variance in experience at the upper  levels of original sin.  This observation 
raises the possibility that countries manage original sin in very different ways. 
Also there appears to be a positive relationship between mismatches and the 
length of time spent in a debt crisis. At the same time, the scatters in Figures 8 and 9 
which feature mismatch on the x-axis seem too chaotic to discern with certainty much 
of a pattern. Further conditioning is likely to be important. 
 As to the “quadratic” or inverse U in the nineteenth century, it seems intuitive 
that the financial centers which were more economically developed had fewer crises 
than nations like Russia, Argentina and Italy. But what about the countries with high 
measures of original sin and a low likelihood of a crisis? These data points include 
primarily the British offshoots like Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the US but 
also  small  European  countries  like  Norway  and  Finland.  This  hump-shaped 
relationship is some (unconditional) evidence that original sin is not always related to 
more financial fragility. There are three possibilities that might explain this inverse U 
pattern. First, some other omitted but observable variable protected these countries 
from crises. Second, some unmeasured but time invariant factor helped them to avoid 
crises (e.g., strong institutions or the market’s “trust”). Finally there is the possibility 
that time-variant unobservable factors such as improvements in the financial system 
or the ability to deal with crises as and when they arose are at play. 
One  might  conjecture  that  these  countries  avoided  crises  because  of  their 
strong  financial  systems  and  fiscal  institutions,  especially  when  compared  to  the 
southern European periphery and the Latin American countries which make up most 
of the observations in the middle ground. In the nineteenth century, casual inspection 
                                                            
18 For debt crises we present the “alternative debt crises” series which takes the numerator to be the 
number of years in which there was no resolution or international agreement on debt repayment rather 
than just the first year of a crisis.  
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of the data suggests that at higher per capita income levels original sin is less likely to 
cause debt or banking crises.
19 The next section controls for a host of other plausible 
factors  that  might  be  omitted  from  this  simple  scatter  plot  and  illustrates  the 
interaction between different types of crises. 
 
 
4. Statistical Findings 
 
Our  statistical  approach  is  a  basic  multivariate  summary  of  the  data.  We 
correlate crisis probabilities with a set of key explanatory variables.
20 We use pooled 
probit specifications,  and the dependent variable is the first  year  of a  debt crisis, 
currency crisis, banking crisis or twin crisis. Our data set is an unbalanced panel, and 
the observational unit is the country year. We omit country years that include ongoing 
crises.  Throughout,  we  control  for  the  lack  of  statistical  independence  between 
country observations by using heteroscedasticity robust, country clustered standard 
errors.
21 We first present specifications with as many variables as is feasible and then 
as a robustness check we drop  the  most statistically insignificant variables or we 
attempt to avoid possible collinearity problems.
22 Finally after using pooled probits 
we  move  to  linear  probability  models  with  country  fixed  effects  to  control  for 
previously  time  invariant  unobservable  variables  that  could  be  causing  spurious 
inferences in the pooled models. 
                                                            
19 The case of Argentina in the late nineteenth century is perplexing in this regard. It was one of the 
richest countries in this period and yet the Baring crisis resulted in a major financial and economic 
blow to the republic. Our inference that higher per capita income alleviated the danger of original sin 
can only be made after disregarding Argentina.  
20 Endogeneity of the regressors as well as usual specification problems may be present. We attempted 
to mitigate endogeneity biases in un-reported specifications by using lagged values of the explanatory 
variables. Results in these cases did not change drastically in qualitative terms. Of course this solution 
is only valid if variables are not too persistent. Also, using lags creates measurement error issues which 
are likely to be problematic for consistent estimation. 
21 We estimated random effects probit models as well but found them to perform weakly as they are 
known to do when the number of explanatory variables is large relative to the sample size. The 
estimated correlation between within country observations was poorly estimated especially in the 
nineteenth century sample. Such specifications are more robust in the later sample and present results 
qualitatively very similar to the pooled probits we present. Finally “fixed effects” logit or conditional 
logit is a non-starter since many countries do not experience crises in the sample. We have however 
estimated linear probability fixed effects models to check the sensitivity of our some baseline models, 
and we present thee below. 
22 The appendix lists the key variables and their availability for each country so the reader can see what 
the various samples look like. The issue of model specification is of course not trivial. We are taking a 
decidedly reduced form approach, and we use the econometrics as supplements to the qualitative 
theoretical conclusions and historical record.   
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For the most part our finding is that more original sin, when not properly 
managed, increases the likelihood of currency banking and debt crises. There is some 
evidence  that  currency  mismatches  catalyze  debt  crises  by  being  at  the  root  of 
banking and currency crises which then feed through to debt problems. However, in 
avoiding debt crises or financial meltdowns there is an important role for the level of 
financial and economic development and other hard to measure factors.  
For example the positive association between original sin or hard currency 
debt on debt crises in both periods and banking crises in the twentieth century is 
smaller at the highest levels of per capita income. Without allowing for an interaction 
between original sin and this key variable, there is a positive and then a negative 
relationship between the ratio of hard currency debt to total debt and the frequency of 
debt and banking crises in the nineteenth century. All of this suggests that original sin 
may contribute to more financial crises but that sometimes the damage can be limited 
as the development process continues.  
Our  findings  point  to  fairly  solid  evidence  that  mismatches  are  positively 
correlated with many types of crises especially in our post-1972 sample. This suggests 
that countries can mitigate the dangers of original sin. We also demonstrate that after 
controlling for country fixed effects, mismatches seem to be linked to banking and 
currency crises in both time periods. Moreover, we also find these types of events 
increase the chances of a debt crisis. Thus mis-managed original sin appears to have 
an important link to financial blowouts.  
As  mentioned,  we also explore  the  inter-relation  between  various  types  of 
crises. We find strong evidence that debt crises are associated with the outbreak of a 
currency crisis in both periods. To some extent, the evidence shows that debt crises 
are associated with banking crises. An interesting difference between the two periods 
arises for twin banking and currency crises. In the nineteenth century, we find that 
banking  crises  and  currency  crises  are  positively  associated  (proxied  by 
contemporaneous and lagged indicators of each type of crisis) though none of the 
coefficients is statistically distinguishable from zero at high levels of confidence. In 
the twentieth century, however, we see a negative relationship between the two types 
of crises. This evidence presents the possibility that conditional on having a crisis, 
episodes of instability were more likely to overwhelm the financial system in the 
nineteenth  century,  whereas  today,  banking  crises  are  quite  unrelated  to  currency 




4.1 Debt Crises 
 
 
  Tables 1 and 2 present results from various specifications where the initial 
year of a debt crisis is the dependent variable. Table 1 is for the 1880 to 1913 sample 
and Table 2 is for the 1972-1997 sample.  
Column one of Table 1 presents a comprehensive specification that includes a 
variable set as large as possible and which also allows for controls for original sin and 
currency mismatches. We see that there is an inverse U shaped pattern in original sin 
and in mismatches.
23 There is also evidence of debt intolerance. These variables are 
statistically significant (at better than the 90 percent level of confidence) at the means 
for each of these controls.
24 Figure 10 illustrates the shape of the marginal effect for 
various values of the hard currency debt ratio with two standard error confidence 
bands.  
The size of the estimated coefficients on the hard currency debt ratios are also 
economically significant. Figure 11 presents the predicted probabilities of a debt crisis 
for various values of the ratio of hard currency debt to total debt. We hold all controls 
at  their  mean  except  the  currency  crisis  indicator  and  the  lagged  banking  crisis 
indicator which take on the value one or zero. By allowing the other crisis indicators 
to  vary,  we  demonstrate  the  strength  of  the  interaction  between  various  types  of 
crises.  Here  one  can  easily  see  the  significance  of  this  measure  of  original  sin 
especially  in  the  range  of  original  sin  equal  to  50  percent  where  the  predicted 
probability  of  having  a  debt  crisis  peaks.  One  also  can  appreciate  the  interaction 
between banking crises, currency crises and debt crises. At an original sin level of 50 
percent, having a banking crisis in the previous year and a currency crisis in the same 
                                                            
23 The reason we include squared terms is twofold: first, the scatter plots suggest there might be such a 
relationship; second, including a simple linear term return a coefficient on original sin that is negative 
and statistically insignificant. The latter result contradicts the basic theoretical proposition in the 
literature and may also arise due to omitted variables biases which we discuss below. The squared term 
allows us to readily illustrate these two possibilities simultaneously 
24 The statistical significance of the interaction effects and polynomial terms must be approached with 
caution. We are interested in the statistical significance of the partial derivative of the probability with 
respect to say hard currency debt at various values. We do not report the statistical significance of such 
an effect for the debt intolerance interactions or for the interactions of variables with GDP. We do 
however present simulated confidence bands and the mean partial effect of original sin arising from the 
quadratic in original sin in figures below. These were calculated using code made available by William 
Clark at http://homepages.nyu.edu/%7emrg217/interaction.html.   
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year increases the predicted probability of a debt crisis by over 10 times from 0.023 to 
0.25. Column 2 pares down the specification dropping the controls for mismatch to 
see if multicollinearity is a problem. We still see a similar quadratic form. Column 3 
leaves out original sin and leaves in the mismatch variables. Mismatch itself does not 
appear to be a strongly statistically significant direct determinant of debt crises in the 
nineteenth century.
25 
The inverse U in original sin says that more original sin is associated with a 
higher likelihood of a debt crisis, but those observations with levels of original sin 
greater than 50 to 60 percent face a lower likelihood of a crisis despite higher levels of 
exposure  to  hard  currency  debt.  These  are  the  countries  in  the  areas  of  recent 
settlement  like  Canada,  Australia,  New  Zealand,  and  the  US  which  had  strong 
financial systems, good fiscal institutions and which borrowed largely for productive 
investments.  The  possibility  of  three  econometric  inference  problems  arise  here: 
extreme  heterogeneity  related  to  time-invariant  characteristics,  omitted  and 
unobservable time-varying characteristics correlated with our explanatory variables 
and  omitted  variables  correlated  with  the  included  variables  that  are  potentially 
observable. We deal with omitted but time invariant factors below, and we see that the 
evidence is unclear as to whether these factors are at play. In any case, the inverse U 
relationship suggests a division of the countries in the nineteenth century sample into 
three groups. The first group includes the financial centers of Europe with low or no 
original sin and few crises. The second and third groups consist of emerging market 
countries.  Countries in the second group possessed stable institutions, strong and 
flexible financial systems able to cope with crises (e.g., the US or Japan, Denmark 
and Sweden) or intricate correspondent banking relationships and colonial ties (e.g., 
Australia,  Canada,  and  New  Zealand).  The  third  group  includes  the  periphery 
countries of the Latin American cone and the Mediterranean region with episodes of 
fiscal  profligacy  (Greece  and  Portugal)  or  periods  of  instability  in  their  banking 
systems (e.g., Argentina with its new banking laws of the 1880s and Italy prior to the 
financial sector restructuring that took place in the 1890s).
26 
In terms of mismatch, there is evidence that past the mean level of mismatch a 
worse mismatch position leads to a lower likelihood of a debt crisis. While the partial 
                                                            
25 This is true even if we exclude the squared mismatch term. 
26 See the capsule histories of these crisis episodes included in Bordo et. al. (2001) for a brief summary 
and further reading. Bordo and Meissner (forthcoming) also report in more detail the experiences of the 
US, Australia, Brazil and Argentina in the 1890s.  
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effects are not highly statistically significant, the point estimates do suggest that on 
the way up to the mean mismatch reserve holdings or greater export exposure can 
limit the chances of a debt crisis. After the mean, the marginal effect is estimated to 
be  negative.  This  could  be  further  substantiation  (albeit  weak  due  to  the  lack  of 
precision in the estimates) of the idea that other factors that we have not controlled for 
such as the ability to deal with and manage crises matter. For example, amongst the 
countries with very high mismatch levels we see Portugal, Italy and Greece but also 
the US, Australia, and Canada. 
Most other variables have signs that fit our priors: more gold reserves relative 
to  notes  outstanding,  a  larger  trade  surplus  to  GDP  ratio,  not  being  on  the  gold 
standard, a lower long-term interest rate, and  a calm international environment in 
capital markets, as measured by the interest rate on British consols, are all associated 
with lower probabilities of debt crises. The statistical significance of the coefficients 
on these variables varies however.
27 There is also evidence as we have seen, that 
currency crises and banking crises are positively associated with the outbreak of a 
debt default. This gives currency to the balance sheet view of crises discussed above. 
We also provide a measure of the fit of the model. This is gauged by the 
percentage  of  actual  crises  that  were  predicted  to  be  crisis  episodes,  and  the 
percentage of non-crisis years that are predicted to be non-crisis years. We use a 
predicted probability of greater than 0.1 to classify a country as having a debt crisis. 
This is a low threshold, but debt crises are relatively rare in the raw sample. (The 
sample frequency is 0.01.) For the debt crises, the type I errors are fairly small and the 
type II errors are mainly concentrated in the country years immediately preceding or 
coming after actual crises.
28 
Table 2 presents the results of similar specifications for debt crises for the 
1972-1997 period. Column 1 shows that there is a positive relationship between our 
measure of original sin and debt crises. The estimate is not too precise just as one 
                                                            
27 Unreported likelihood ratio tests between the shorter and longer models cannot reject their 
equivalence. Perhaps the positive coefficient on the gold standard variable is compatible with theories 
that argue that rigid exchange rate policies amplify negative external shocks more than flexible rates. 
But since the statistical significance varies a lot by specification, we do not see overwhelming evidence 
for any hypothesis suggesting a positive or negative coefficient here. See Edwards (2003) for a wide-
ranging discussion of exchange rate regimes and crises.  
28 For other types of crises we fail to correctly classify many crisis episodes even at low thresholds. We 
use the 0.1 barrier for currency and banking crises. Obviously our tabulations are sensitive to these 
thresholds. Our maximum predicted probabilities rarely exceed 0.2 for any type of crisis.  
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might expect after having looked at the scatter plots. The experience at high levels of 
original sin appears to be quite varied even after conditioning on a host of controls.  
In  column  1  there  is  no  sign  of  mismatch  being  a  statistically  significant 
determinant  of  debt  crises  and  no  evidence  of  debt  intolerance.  Similar  to  the 
nineteenth  century,  we  do  see  a  positive  and  statistically  significant  association 
between  currency  crises  and  debt  crises.  Having  a  currency  crisis  raises  the 
probability of having a debt crisis by over 5 percentage points. The point estimates on 
contemporary  and  lagged  values  of  banking  crises  are  positive  but  not  highly 
statistically significant.  
To take the strain off the sample with so many explanatory variables, we pare 
down the specification in column 2 and find that original sin has a positive impact on 
the likelihood of a crisis, and it is now slightly more statistically significant. Column 
4eliminates the original sin measure and reinstates the mismatch measure to see if 
collinearity might have been the reason for the low precision in column 1. Indeed in 
column four we see that mismatches increase the susceptibility to debt crises and the 
marginal effect is statistically significant. A one point increase in the mismatch ratio 
(equivalent to one standard deviation) would imply that the probability of a debt crisis 
increases by 0.02.  
Column 3 introduces the  logarithm  of GDP per capita and its square as a 
control variable.
29 This allows us to show how GDP per capita interacts with original 
sin to affect crisis outcomes. When we do this we see that middle income countries, 
roughly where the emerging markets would be located, are the most likely to have a 
crisis  when  other  control  variables  are  held  constant.  Figure  12  shows  this  by 
presenting the predicted probability of a crisis for various levels of per capita output 
holding original sin at 100 (its maximum and also the modal value). We also compare 
those probabilities when the currency crisis indicator is one and zero so as to show yet 
again that at any level of output per capita currency crises and debt crises are likely to 
come together when original sin is high. It should be noted that the hump shaped 
pattern does not disappear when we include the mismatch position along with the 
                                                            
29 We tried simply interacting original sin with GDP per capita as we did for the 1880-1913 period but 
the results seemed counterintuitive although we cannot rule out such a specification for any other 
reason. We found the marginal effect of original sin was negative and approached zero for higher levels 
of GDP per capita. On the other hand the marginal effect of GDP per capita was negative and 
approached zero as original sin increased. We also interacted original sin directly with GDP per capita 
and its square. The marginal effects were consistent with the idea that original sin’s marginal impact is 
largest at intermediate levels of per capita GDP.  
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original sin measure or even by itself. In fact mismatch enters with a negative sign 
and is highly statistically insignificant in either specification. 
The quadratic hump we see in the predicted probabilities leads us to suggest 
that countries can be broken into three categories when original sin is high. First, to 
the  left,  are  the  poorest  countries  (e.g.,  Colombia,  Nigeria,  and  Pakistan)  which, 
despite suffering from original sin, are not relying on external finance as much as the 
countries in the “big push” phase  of development (e.g., Argentina, Brazil, Korea, 
Mexico, and Taiwan). Then, to the far right, there are the highly developed countries 
(e.g., Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Spain, and Sweden) which because they 
are  small,  or  unlucky  not  to  have  a  key  currency,  also  suffer  from  liability 
dollarization. Nevertheless, either external financing is less significant  or they have 
the  capability  to  deal  with  shocks  to  the  financial  system  in  ways  we  have  not 
controlled for and hence to avoid crises. The middle income emerging markets which 
rely on external financing are the ones most at risk of seeing their hard currency 
liabilities interact with currency crashes leading to a debt default episode. 
Figure 13 illustrates this four part categorization. Here the “radar” graph plots 
variables  of  interest  on  each  axis  and  the  lines  connecting  the  particular  values 
represent the ordering of the different groups of countries. We classified countries 
into four groups based on GDP per capita and levels of original sin. The first are those 
with  GDP  per  capita  lower  than  $2,900  where  the  average  level  of  original  sin 
between 1993 and 1997 was 99.9 percent. The second are those with GDP per capita 
between $2,900 and $8,100 with an average value of average original sin equal to 76, 
and finally two groups with GDP above $8,100 one with an original sin level greater 
than 20 percent and also one with less than 20 percent.  
Next we chose variables of interest such as the average trade deficit within 
each group, the average time spent in a debt crisis, the average predicted probability 
of a debt crisis  (based on  the model in column three of table 2) and the median 
predicted probability based on the same model and our mismatch variable. The richest 
countries are lower on all five dimensions. The middle income, emerging markets are 
highest on these dimensions except for the average predicted probability of having a 
debt crisis.
30 Trade deficits are twice as high on average in these countries and they 
                                                            
30 This measure is sensitive to the GDP cutoff point. If we lower it slightly then we include a few more 
countries like Chile and Venezuela which had debt crises. This reverses the ordering on this dimension. 
In any case the difference is not significant..  
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have a median predicted probability twice as high as the less developed countries. . 
There are quite a few observations of rich countries with original sin higher than 20 
percent (or 50 percent for that matter). So while one might be tempted to argue that 
only  rich countries were free from original sin and hence have lower probabilities of 
a crisis these numbers refute such an argument. It would appear that many of the 
richest  countries  have  original  sin  and  still  have  a  low  chance  of  a  debt  crisis. 
Moreover  the  figure  suggests  such  countries  run  bigger  trade  surpluses  or  lower 
deficits  and  also  control  their  mismatch  positions  better  than  the  middle  income 
countries making them even less prone to crisis episodes. Nevertheless it would be 
wrong to assume that this is all of the story as the probit results which hold other 
factors constant show. Figure 12 illustrates that even after controlling for these factors 
middle income countries seem to be more at risk. 
   
 
4.2 Currency Crises 
 
Column 1 of Table 3 presents an inclusive specification where the dependent 
variable is the probability of having a currency crisis between 1880 and 1913.
 31 There 
are 17 events to be predicted in this sample. None of the variables are statistically 
significant  at  standard  levels  of  confidence  except  for  the  gold  cover  ratio. 
Endogeneity is a worry here since quite obviously it would be much lower in the 
midst of an attack on a currency.  
In terms of marginal effects, we see still see a quadratic in original sin in 
column 2, and a positive relationship between the mismatch variable in column three. 
Some marginal effects of the other variables have the expected signs while others do 
not. However, nothing in column two or three is statistically significant except for the 
trade balance to GDP which has a positive sign as it did in the Frankel and Rose 
                                                            
31  As  Flandreau  and  Zúmer  (2004)  have  emphasized,  the  debt  revenue  ratio  and  the  original  sin 
variables can increase when the nominal exchange rate changes and when there is hard currency debt. 
To the extent that this supports the argument that a crisis is more likely with a depreciation, then there 
is no problem here. But an endogeneity problem could arise if we predict currency crises with variables 
that are functions of the nominal exchange rate such as the hard currency debt ratio. To avoid this issue 
we  tried  lagging  such  variables  in  the  currency  crisis  specifications.  Our  results  regarding  such 
variables in the currency crisis regressions are similar in qualitative terms when we use one or two lags 
of mismatch, hard currency to total debt and the debt to revenue ratio.   
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(1996)  study  of  the  late  twentieth  century.
32  Lagging  this  variable  causes  the 
magnitude  of  the coefficient  and  its  statistical significance  to fall  also  suggesting 
some endogeneity problems. 
The positive coefficient on the mismatch variable suggests that original sin is 
dangerous, but that countries that have original sin may be able to avoid currency 
crises if they manage to collect adequate reserves or are sufficiently open. Since the 
outbreak of a debt crisis seems to be associated with currency crises (see Table 1), this 
is  weak  evidence  that  poorly  managed  original  sin  is  indirectly  associated  with 
currency crises. 
In Table 4 we present similar specifications that try to explain currency crises 
between 1972 and 1997. Here there is evidence that original sin leads to a higher 
chance  of  a  currency  crisis  when  we  do  not  control  for  the  mismatch  position. 
Mismatches however do seem to be strongly associated with currency crises both 
controlling for original sin (column one) and not controlling for original sin (column 
3). This result is again highly suggestive that proper management of original sin can 
help alleviate not only currency crises but the chain reactions leading to debt default 
related to balance sheet effects. 
The current account is negatively related to currency crises (as is intuitive). 
Increases in long-term interest rates lead to more crises as do rapid increases in the 
money  supply.  These  marginal  effects  are  all  statistically  significant  throughout. 
There is some evidence that a banking crisis in the previous year is associated with a 
currency crisis (p-value 0.16).  
Overall the models in the nineteenth century fit poorly as judged by the high 
Type I errors while the models of the twentieth century make far fewer of such errors. 
The opposite is true of type II errors. In the latter sample, far too many currency crises 
are predicted. In terms of comparison, it seems as if the most we can say is that 
mismatches  contribute  to  currency  crises  in  both  periods.  At  the  same  time  this 
comparison is strained because of the high degree of uncertainty surrounding the point 
estimates of the marginal effects.  
   
                                                            
32 Alas, the marginal effect of changes in the current account in their paper was statistically 
insignificant. The seemingly counter-intuitive result that net exporters have a higher chance of a crisis 
seems to arise from the fact that the small peripheral countries in our sample tend to be net exporters 
while GB, France and Switzerland, for example, have highly negative ratios for this variable and had of 
course   
 
25 
4.3 Banking Crises 
   
  In  pooled  probit  specifications  there  is  no  overwhelming  evidence  that 
banking  crises  are associated  with  original  sin  and  currency  mismatches  in  either 
period.  However,  the evidence  is  again  mixed  in  terms  of  statistical significance. 
Similar to what we see with debt crises, there appear to be factors that diminish the 
impact of original sin. Between 1880 and 1913 we see a quadratic or inverse U as we 
did in Table 1. Between 1972 and 1997 we see that the impact of more original sin is 
higher in low and middle income countries than in high income countries. There is 
evidence of a straightforward positive link between mismatch and banking crises in 
the twentieth century. 
  Column one of Table 5 presents a baseline probit model for banking crises. 
Here we see the same inverse U pattern for original sin that we saw with debt crises. 
However we cannot reject the hypothesis that the entire marginal effect is zero at 
standard levels of confidence.  
 
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 5 re-run the basic specification of column 1 to see if 
collinearity between original sin and mismatch contributed to the lack of precision. It 
turns out that in neither column are the coefficients much different and their statistical 
significance does not change dramatically.
33 In terms of fit, all of the models seem 
nearly equivalent by the log likelihood values. Only about 20 percent of actual sample 
crises are predicted reliably. Most of the other controls have the expected signs but 
are  not  statistically  significant  except  the  trade  surplus  to  GDP  ratio.  We  do  see 
positive marginal effects  on the currency crisis indicators  but neither of them  are 
statistically significant at conventional levels. 
Table  6  turns  to  the  late  twentieth  century.  In  column  one  we  see  results 
similar to the debt crisis specifications in Table 2. Original sin and mismatch are 
positively related to crises but alas they are both statistically indistinguishable from 
zero.  Column  two  demonstrates  that  original  sin  is  not  statistically  insignificant 
because of severe collinearity with the mismatch control. Columns three and four are 
more promising in terms of substantive lessons. In column three we tried to see if an 
                                                            
33 One possibility why mismatch is not significant here, while it seems to be in the twentieth century, is 
that the measure here relates only to public debt and borrowing. In the twentieth century sample the 
measure includes both public and private borrowing. As we shall see, controlling for such 
heterogeneity shows mismatch is positively correlated to banking crises in the nineteenth century.  
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interaction  between  the  logarithm  of  GDP  per  capita  and  original  sin  made  the 
estimates more precise. Figure 14 illustrates that at higher levels of GDP per person a 
100 percent level of original sin is less dangerous. The predicted probability drops by 
more than one third when moving from an income level of slightly less than $3,000 
(e.g.  Mexico,  Malaysia,  Thailand,  Brazil  in  1995)  to  an  income  level  matching 
Austria,  Canada,  Denmark,  or  the  US  of  roughly  $22,000.
34  Finally  column  four 
shows  that  the  marginal  effect  of  a  greater  mismatch  is  positive  and  statistically 
significant. A one point increase in the mismatch variable would lead to a substantive 
increase  in the predicted probability of  roughly 0.02 percentage points.  The  other 
controls that are statistically significant are the growth of the money supply (positive 
coefficient), the trade surplus to GDP ratio (negative) and the long-term interest rate 
(positive). We find negative point estimates for the marginal effects of currency crises 
and lagged currency crises but these are not close to being statistically significant. 
Overall the results again suggest that avoiding mismatches and other unobservables 
that may be highly correlated with GDP per capita in some way affect how dangerous 
original sin is. We also find no evidence that currency crises cause or are associated 
with banking crises in this late twentieth century sample. This final bit of evidence 
suggests to us that there is a big difference between banking crises in the nineteenth 
century and the twentieth century. Specifically banking crises seem to be isolated 
events in the most recent period, and we conjecture they have their roots in regulation, 
deregulation  and  domestic  liberalization.  In  the  previous  period  banking  was  less 
regulated, more open, less protected by a lender of last resort, and there is some very 
weak evidence of a more direct connection between currency and banking distress. 
 
4.4 Robustness: Controlling for Country-Level Heterogeneity 
 
  In our nineteenth century sample we found some evidence that after a certain 
point more hard currency debt relative to the total seemed to be associated with fewer 
debt  crises  and  banking  crises.  In  the  late  twentieth  century,  we  also  see  some 
evidence that original sin interacts in a complex way with GDP per capita. Above we 
noted that this finding could be due to unobservables or omitted observables. 
                                                            
34 These figures are measured in real 1989 US dollars.  
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One robustness check is to make sure that these findings are not spurious or 
due  to  the  possibility  that  the  level  of  original  sin  is  correlated  with  factors  or 
characteristics of countries we have left out of the analysis. Perhaps those most at risk 
take care  to protect  their financial systems from crises or have effective ways of 
dealing with crises despite their high levels of original sin. If these factors were time 
invariant,  an  econometric  solution  to  such  a  problem  is  to  include  country-level 
indicator variables or “fixed effects”. 
Since this is infeasible to do in a limited dependent variable model with our 
particular data configuration, we move to a “fixed effects” linear probability model 
estimated by OLS. Table 7 re-specifies the models of column 1 from Table 1, column 
1 of Table 3 and column 1 of Table 5 in this way.  Like the previous results, the 
models fit fairly poorly since there are so few crises compared to non-crisis years. 
Many of the coefficients on the basic macro controls are statistically insignificant. 
Nevertheless the results regarding the coefficients on the original sin and mismatch 
variables are qualitatively very similar to the findings in the previous tables.  
  For  debt  crises  and  banking  crises,  we  find  evidence  of  the  very  same 
quadratic pattern from Table 1 and Table 5. However the marginal effect of the hard 
currency debt ratio is not statistically significant.
35 We take away three lessons from 
column 1 and column 3. The fact that the quadratic shape (i.e., the point estimates on 
original sin and its square are positive and negative respectively) does not disappear 
suggests that it is unlikely to be time invariant unobservables which are causing the 
inverse U. If it were simply a case of omitted time invariant variables we would have 
expected the inclusion of fixed effects to reveal a statistically significant and positive 
relationship between original sin and crises. At the same time, there are two other 
possible interpretations of column one and column three. One is that since original sin 
moves  relatively  slowly  over  time  the  fixed  effects  would  naturally  be  unable  to 
estimate the impact of original sin on crises. But equally one might also conclude that 
hard currency debt is not associated with debt or banking crises once proper controls 
are included, and we cannot rule this out. Only more clever identification strategies or 
more data will be able confirm which one of these assertions is correct. 
                                                            
35 That is, the true marginal effect of changes in the hard currency debt ratio (at all values of the hard 
currency debt ratio) calculated with the analytical standard error of the marginal effect and not the 




If  one  still  argued for  the  inverse  U  on  the  grounds  that  fixed  effects  are 
inefficient and an inappropriate specification, then for the nineteenth century we are 
left with the result that time-invariant underlying fundamentals like empire status or 
resource  endowments  probably  do  not  explain  how  places  like  the  US,  Canada, 
Australia and Scandinavia managed to carry high original sin and also avoid severe 
financial crises. There is also no evidence that a better mismatch position directly 
helped avoid debt crises. This suggests the possibility that these places had a more 
active approach to managing crises or their financial systems were structured in a way 
that helped stave off financial meltdown following a major shock.
36 Oppositely there 
is little evidence that places like Argentina, Brazil, Greece, Italy, and Portugal faced 
financial  meltdowns  because  of  time-invariant  characteristics  such  as  “bad 
government”  or  institutions  or  simply  because  they  were  in  the  geographic  or 
economic  periphery.
37  Moreover  we  can  observe  that  financial  systems  and 
institutions  change  significantly  over  time  within  countries.  The  run  up  to  the 
Portuguese debt debacle in 1892 witnessed fiscal excess or the Argentinean financial 
system of the 1880s was poorly designed. But in the wake of these crises structural 
reforms may have been made that secured a more sustainable financial position in 
later decades. To eliminate the quadratic and have the hope of revealing a positive 
marginal effect of hard currency debt we would need better controls and indicators for 
                                                            
36 The endogeneity of the level of original sin should be explored and other experiences across time 
should be compared. The endogeneity bias would appear to be small. Eichengreen, Hausmann and 
Panizza (2003, 2005), and Flandreau and Sussman (2005) take the view that original sin is inversely 
related to country size. Having a financial center also decreases original sin. Being large and/or having 
a financial center makes for liquid markets in the domestic currency and increases the demand for such 
assets in the portfolio of international investors. Because of this, “endogeneity” may be less of an issue 
than one might conjecture at the outset. Evidence from Australia, New Zealand and the US in Bordo, 
Meissner and Redish (2005) suggests that wars and large shocks that closed international markets and 
forced governments into the domestic markets catalyzed the process. Still other factors are obviously 
necessary for these factors to be viable explanations.  
 
37 In other un-reported specifications, we tried using proxies for good institutions and financial 
development in our probit models. We included the ratio of the money stock to GDP, a British Empire 
indicator, a central bank indicator and a branch banking indicator. None of these variables eliminated 
the quadratic pattern or gave rise to a conditionally positive relationship between original sin and debt 
crises, currency crises or banking crises. In the debt crisis specifications, it is not feasible to estimate 
the equations with an empire dummy simply because no included dominion, colony or other member of 
the British Commonwealth ever had a debt default in this period. This indicator would be a perfect 
predictor of not having a debt crisis. So we are left clinging to the notion that the countries with lots of 
original sin like the US Canada, Australia and New Zealand and perhaps the Scandinavian countries 
were different along other dimensions than those captured by these proxy variables. Caballero, Cowan 
and Kearns (2004) talk about currency-trust and country-trust which could be factors at play here but 
which are not easily captured with any one explanatory variable.  
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the robustness of the financial system and so forth. More research is clearly required 
here. 
For currency crises, the link between a crisis and original sin (or mismatch) is 
indirect  since  the  coefficients  on  hard  currency  debt  are  not  highly  statistically 
significant. Rather it turns out that the association between original sin and currency 
crises seems to be coming through the outbreak of banking problems in the previous 
year. Indeed mismatches seem to be positively associated with banking crises as seen 
in column 3 even after controlling for unobservables in this way. The coefficient is 
highly statistically significant as well. In column 2 there is evidence that banking 
crises do have an impact on currency crises which in turn have a positive impact on 
debt crises as seen in column 1. This suggests that good debt management and sound 
borrowing practices were at the root of preventing financial meltdown.  
  We also performed a fixed effects linear probability model for the 1972-1997 
period and report these results in Table 8. Given the way we have chosen to control 
for original sin by using the 1993-1997 average we are unable to control for this key 
variable. The key determinants of debt crises seem to be the debt output ratio, interest 
rates and also the existence of a currency crisis. Most of the other coefficients are not 
statistically significant.  
Importantly  we  also  find  that  mismatch  is  positively  and  statistically 
significantly related to currency crises (p-value 0.026), and for banking crises the 
coefficient is also positive but only has a p-value of 0.19. We note a similar indirect 
connection to debt crises as in the nineteenth century. The chain of logic points to the 
following conclusion. Better borrowing safeguards in the form of lower mismatches 
could  stem  the  explosion  of  a  currency  crisis.  Since  contemporary  and  lagged 
currency crises appear to be strongly associated with debt crises in column 1 of Table 
8, all else equal, it is likely that better mismatches can limit exposure to financial 
implosion. 
The  evidence  from  controlling  for  unobservables  and  country-specific 
heterogeneity provides very mixed evidence (at best) for the idea that original sin 
itself  is  the  culprit  for  major  financial  meltdowns.  On  the  other  hand  mismatch 
matters.  Lower  mismatches  seem  to  be  associated  in  both  periods  with  fewer 
outbreaks  of  currency  or  banking  crises.  Stemming  these  types  of  crises  assists 
countries in avoiding the onset of a debt default or a total financial meltdown. The 
presence  of  original  sin  makes  implementing  safeguards  important.  Reserve  
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accumulation or openness to exports are viable strategies to avoid trouble currency 
and banking runs which in turn have a high likelihood themselves of feeding through 






Our central finding is that hard currency debt itself may not always generate a 
higher likelihood of a financial crisis. Some countries in the nineteenth century with 
very  high  levels  of  original  sin  were  less  prone  to  debt  crises  than  those  with 
intermediate levels. In the late twentieth century, many countries have original sin 
levels of 100 percent and have avoided crises. On the other hand, emerging markets 
that also suffer from original sin fell victim to debt crises and had high financial 
instability.  
We find evidence that not backing up hard currency debt with foreign reserves 
and having a larger export sector for a given level of hard currency debt can both help 
decrease the incidence of debt, currency and banking crises. Mismatches matter. We 
have found evidence both before 1913 and since 1972 that they matter for banking 
and currency crises. Moreover, since there is evidence that outbreaks of banking and 
currency  crises  are  associated  with  debt  crises,  mismatches  are  associated  at  a 
fundamental  level  with  more  robust  financial  systems.  The  evidence  is  then  that 
original sin matters when not properly managed. Reserve accumulation, openness to 
international  trade  and  exchange  rate  policy  are  all  important.  Nevertheless  our 
mismatch measure is far from ideal, and it is somewhat collinear with the original sin 
measure.  More and  better data  is the only  solution to this  identification problem. 
Nevertheless Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza (2003) argue that original sin is a 
second best outcome. If countries cannot issue own-currency debt and then are forced 
by market discipline to hold costly reserves to insure themselves against currency 
speculation this may not be socially optimal.  
The interaction effects we tested for lead us to suggest a division of various 
types of countries. Three or four categories seem to be apparent. The financial centers 
with low original sin and strong financial fundamentals obviously avoid crises. Other 
highly developed countries that are small in terms of global output, and carry high  
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original sin also avoid severe financial crises. In terms of less developed countries, 
there are many which are relatively closed to external capital flows or have yet to kick 
start the development process. These countries also have original sin like the rest of 
the  world  but  are  not  prone  to  volatile  capital  movements.  The  most  dangerous 
combination seems to be high original sin in an emerging market. These countries saw 
huge capital inflows in the 1880s, the late 1970s and early 1980s and again in the 
early 1990s. Their fragility to current account reversals and the virulence of these two 
major episodes is no doubt explained in part by exposure to hard currency liabilities. 
There is also a bigger picture in terms of the interaction between crises. We 
find evidence of connections between banking, currency and debt crises. The balance 
sheet view of crises or the third generation type of crisis is as much of a fact of life 
today  as  it  was  in  the  late  nineteenth  century.  Given  that  third  generation  crises 
remain a possibility, the evidence suggests that better balance sheet management will 
be necessary to help avoid crises. It will also keep financial turbulence from becoming 
a financial catastrophe. 
Finally  we  end  on  a  cautious  note.  Our  results  are  fragile  to  the  exact 
specification we impose and the sample sizes are precariously small. The econometric 
techniques  and  specifications  could  be  further  refined  as  a  means  to  improve 
efficiency. The models we estimate are not direct estimates of structural equations. 
The original sin data is incomplete and more and better measures will have to be 
collected. We need more comprehensive measures that include domestic original sin 
and private finance. We also need longer time series of the original sin measure than 
those currently available. Once this data has been collected and analysed, our tentative 
assertions will face more stringent tests. We offer early conclusions, but to improve 
our understanding of the connection between hard currency debt and financial chaos 
better data availability is of the utmost importance.  
Again, our bottom line is that original sin often makes debt crises more likely and 
makes avoiding currency and banking crises more difficult.  But the lesson from two 
different periods of globalization is that more careful debt management policies and 
the development of sound fiscal and financial institutions seem to make it possible for 
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For the 1972-1997 sample most of our macroeconomic variables come from Bordo et. 
al. (2001) and sources are described therein. Where a variable was missing we filled it 
in according to the descriptions below and in the text. 
 
Debt:  
1880-1913: In general we have defined external debt or hard currency debt as the 
amount outstanding of long-term debt issued abroad plus the amount outstanding of 
domestic  gold  (or  silver)  debt.  Internal  debt  refers  to  the  outstanding  stock  of 
domestic paper debt. However in a few cases listed below we have not been able to 
discern from the sources how much of the “domestic” or internal debt was payable in 
gold. More work will have to be put into these cases. However, one will note that for 
these cases the total amount of domestic debt is rather small. 
 
1972-1997: Most data was available in the World Bank’s Global Development 
Finance database. This includes many varieties of international obligations0 including 
private, official and multilateral debt. We supplemented this with external debt from 
the International Financial Statistics. 
 
Long-term interest rates:  





Exchange rate regimes: Data on gold standard adherence comes from Meissner 
(forthcoming) augmented with data from Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) 
 
Default Indicator:  
1880-1913: Our default indicator was created if there were one or more defaults prior 
to 1880.  
1972-1997: Our default indicator was created if there were one or more defaults prior 
to 1972.  
This data is taken from a spreadsheet underlying Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano 
(2003). 
 
Crisis Dating: As in Bordo et. al ( 2001) we date currency and banking crises using 
both qualitative and quantitative evidence. For all countries besides Austria-Hungary, 
Russia, New Zealand, South Africa, Mexico, Turkey, Egypt, Uruguay and India we 
have relied on the dates of Bordo et. al. We have tried to date currency crises, when 
possible, by using an approach based on the exchange market pressure (EMP) 
methodology which looks at changes in reserves, the exchange rate and the interest 
rate. 
Debt  crisis  dates  were  based  on  Beim and Calomiris  (2001).  Only  private 
lending to sovereign nations is considered when building those default dates. Not 
every  instance  of  technical  default  is  included  in  the  chronology,  the  authors 
identified  periods  (six  months  or  more)  where  all  or  part  of  interest/principal 
payments  were  suspended,  reduced  or  rescheduled.  Some  of  those  episodes  are 
outright debt repudiations, while others were reschedulings agreed upon mutually by 
lenders and borrowers. Also data is taken from a spreadsheet underlying Reinhart, 












Table 1 Determinants of Debt Crises, 1880-1913 
Regressors
(1) (2) (3)
Hard currency debt as 0.075** 0.061**  ---
a percentage of total debt (0.031) (0.030)
Square of hard currency  -0.073** -0.069**  ---
debt ratio (0.030) (0.027)
Debt/Revenue -0.002* -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Debt/Revenue*Pre-1880 Default 0.009*** 0.003 0.005*
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Pre-1880 Default  -0.221*** -0.058 -0.129*
(0.018) (0.062) (0.074)
Mismatch 0.003  --- 0.005
(0.003) (0.005)
Square of mismatch -0.001  --- -0.001
(0.0004) (0.001)
Trade balance/GDP -0.054 0.002 0.002
(0.044) (0.055) (0.058)
Long-term interest rate 0.004 0.003** 0.005*
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
Consol interest rate 0.017 0.014 0.021
(0.011) (0.016) (0.017)
Gold standard dummy 0.022 0.006 0.015
(0.017) (0.013) (0.012)
Growth of the money supply -0.031 -0.020 -0.023
(0.025) (0.017) (0.016)
Gold reserves/notes in circulation -0.072** -0.034 -0.057**
(0.035) (0.028) (0.027)
Currency crisis in t 0.060** 0.031 0.075*
(0.026) (0.022) (0.041)
Currency crisis in t-1 -0.001 0.012 0.0004
(0.008) (0.016) (0.010)
Banking crisis in t 0.017 -0.004 0.038
(0.013) (0.010) (0.031)
Banking crisis in t-1 0.049 0.034 0.015
(0.033) (0.021) (0.017)
constant -4.11 -4.72 -6.33
(3.52) (2.35)** (2.77)**
Number of obs 530 530 530
Percentage of Correct Positives 83.3 66.7 83.3
Percentage of Correct Negatives 98 98.6 98.8
Psuedo R-squared 0.64 0.50 0.56
log-likelihood value -11.93 -16.3 -14.3
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary indicator for a debt crisis. Marginal effects of variables on 
the probability of a crisis are reported. Robust clustered standard errors
are in parentheses. See the text for precise definitions of variables. Positive signifies crisis year; * p-
value < 0.1; ** p-value < 0.05; *** p-value < 0.01 
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Table 2 Determinants of Debt Crises, 1972-1997 
 
Regressors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Original Sin 0.016* 0.008* 0.002  ---
(0.010) (0.005) (0.002)
Debt/Output 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***  ---
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Debt/Output*Pre-1970 Default 0.0001  ---  ---  ---
(0.0002)
Pre-1970 Default  -0.034  ---  ---  ---
(0.043)
Mismatch -0.003  ---  --- 0.020***
(0.006) (0.006)
ln (real GDP per capita)  ---  --- 0.316**  ---
(0.145)
square of ln (real GDP per capita)  ---  --- -0.019**  ---
(0.009)
Trade balance/GDP 0.002 0.002 0.001 -0.0001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Long-term interest rate 0.009*** 0.006** 0.001 0.005**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
G7 average long term interest rate 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.007***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.158) (0.003)
Pegged exchange rate regime -0.033*** -0.025*** -0.018*** -0.008
(0.009) (0.007) (0.005) (0.015)
Currency crisis in t 0.053* 0.049* 0.054** 0.061*
(0.030) (0.029) (0.026) (0.036)
Currency crisis in t-1 0.045 0.034 0.024 0.071**
(0.028) (0.023) (0.015) (0.033)
Banking crisis in t -0.000 0.005 0.009 0.010
(0.016) (0.015) (0.013) (0.018)
Banking crisis in t-1 0.020 0.016 0.014 0.002
(0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.022)
constant -26.68 -26.77 -52.17 -4.42
(9.69) (9.69) (17.44) (0.63)
Number of obs 520 530 524 571
Percentage of Correct Positives 82.3 82.3 93.75 50
Percentage of Correct Negatives 93.8 93.9 95.4 91.1
Psuedo R-squared 0.50 0.49 .54 0.25
log-likelihood value -37.82 -37.8 -32.33 -64.55
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary indicator for a debt crisis. Marginal effects of variables on the probability of a 
crisis are reported. Robust clustered standard errors are in parentheses. 
See the text for precise definitions of variables. Positive signifies crisis year; * p-value < 0.1; ** p-value < 0.05; *** p-















Hard currency debt as -0.009 0.019  ---
a percentage of total debt (0.057) (0.044)
Square of hard currency  -0.003 -0.011  ---
debt ratio (0.061) (0.047)
Mismatch 0.002  --- 0.003
(0.003) (0.003)
Debt/Revenue -0.002 -0.001 -0.003
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Growth of terms of trade 0.524  ---  ---
(0.374)
Trade balance/GDP 0.138 0.191** 0.226***
(0.101) (0.089) (0.087)
Long-term interest rate 0.004 0.004 0.003
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Consol interest rate -0.004 0.007 0.004
(0.026) (0.023) (0.025)
Gold standard dummy 0.038  ---  ---
(0.025)
Growth of the money supply -0.051 -0.041 -0.041
(0.109) (0.067) (0.069)
Gold reserves/notes in circulation -0.052* -0.024 -0.019
(0.028) (0.023) (0.023)
Banking Crisis in t 0.035  ---  ---
(0.052)
Banking Crisis in t-1 0.084  ---  ---
(0.083)
constant -1.51 -1.79 -1.57
(1.27) (1.05) (1.05)
Number of obs 500 555 555
Percentage of Correct Positives 11.7 0 5.9
Percentage of Correct Negatives 94 98 98.8
Psuedo R-squared 0.0871 0.0479 0.053
log-likelihood value -67.72 -72.35 -71.94
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary indicator for a currency crisis. Marginal effects of variables on 
the probability of a crisis are reported. Robust clustered standard errors 
are in parentheses. See the text for precise definitions of variables.  Positive signifies crisis year. * p-









Original Sin 0.0007 0.001**  ---
(0.001) (0.001)
Mismatch 0.040***  --- 0.032***
(0.013) (0.011)
Debt/Output 0.001** 0.001*** 0.0004
(0.000) (0.000) (0.0003)
Growth of terms of trade -0.001  ---  ---
(0.002)
Trade balance/GDP -0.007** -0.007*** -0.007***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Pegged exchnage rate regime 0.066  ---  ---
(0.057)
Long-term interest rate 0.022*** 0.012*** 0.014***
(0.007) (0.004) (0.003)
G7 average long term interest rate -0.012* -0.010 -0.007
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
Growth of the money supply 0.00005*** 0.0001*** 0.00006***
(0.00001) (0.00004) (0.00001)
M2 / Reserves 0.007*** 0.007*** -0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Banking Crisis in t -0.038  --- -0.063
(0.054) (0.048)
Banking Crisis in t-1 0.095  --- 0.096
(0.078) (0.071)
constant -2.83 -2.22 -1.76
(0.55) (0.35) (0.31)
Number of obs 419 609 641
Percentage of Correct Positives 83.6 89.4 77.9
Percentage of Correct Negatives 52.7 37.4 46.1
Psuedo R-squared 0.13 0.07 0.082
log-likelihood value -150.71 -226.56 -232.44
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary indicator for a currency crisis. Marginal effects of variables 
on the probability of a crisis are reported. Robust clustered standard errors 
are in parentheses. See the text for precise definitions of variables.  Positive signifies 
crisis year. * p-value < 0.1; ** p-value < 0.05; *** p-value < 0.01 
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Hard currency debt as 0.018 0.035  ---
a percentage of total debt (0.075) (0.067)
Square of hard currency  -0.024 -0.037  ---
debt ratio (0.078) (0.072)
Debt/Revenue -0.002 -0.0002 -0.002
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Mismatch 0.004  --- 0.004
(0.003) (0.004)
Growth of terms of trade -0.592 -0.542 -0.578
(0.381) (0.378) (0.387)
Trade balance/GDP 0.364** 0.323** 0.356**
(0.176) (0.160) (0.163)
Gold standard dummy -0.006 0.000 -0.010
(0.022) (0.019) (0.020)
Growth of the money supply 0.038 0.030 0.029
(0.069) (0.071) (0.072)
Gold reserves/notes in circulation 0.025 0.026 0.038
(0.030) (0.024) (0.029)
Long-term interest rate 0.004 0.006 0.004
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Consol interest rate 0.023 0.026 0.024
(0.026) (0.026) (0.025)
Currency crisis in t 0.073 0.079 0.075
(0.070) (0.075) (0.072)
Currency crisis in t-1 0.072 0.068 0.073
(0.075) (0.074) (0.080)
constant -2.75 -2.94 -2.75
(0.94) (0.89) (0.92)
Number of obs 496 496 496
Percentage of Correct Positives 16.6 22.2 16.6
Percentage of Correct Negatives 96.6 96.8 96.4
Psuedo R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.07
log-likelihood value -71.56 -71.99 -71.63
 Positive signifies crisis year. * p-value < 0.1; ** p-value < 0.05; *** p-value < 0.01
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary indicator for a banking crisis. Marginal effects of variables 
on the probability of a crisis are reported. Robust clustered standard errors are in parentheses. 
See the text for precise definitions of variables.  
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Original Sin 0.001 0.001 0.050***  ---
(0.001) (0.001) (0.016)
Mismatch 0.017  ---  --- 0.020**
(0.011) (0.010)
Original Sin * ln(real GDP per capita)  ---  --- -0.005***  ---
(0.002)
ln(real GDP per capita)  ---  --- 0.496***  ---
(0.158)
Debt/Output -0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0002
(0.0005) (0.004) (0.0004) (0.0003)
Growth of terms of trade -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Trade balance/GDP -0.006** -0.004 -0.006** -0.003
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Pegged exchnage rate regime -0.002 -0.008 -0.015 0.014
(0.023) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021)
Growth of the money supply 0.00005* 0.00007*** 0.0007*** 0.00006*
(0.0003) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00003)
M2 / Reserves 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.00006
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.00007)
Long-term interest rate 0.013*** 0.011** 0.014** 0.008*
(0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005)
G7 average long term interest rate 0.0001 0.002 -0.002 0.002
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Currency crisis in t -0.015 -0.012 -0.012 -0.026
(0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.028)
Currency crisis in t-1 -0.021 -0.023 -0.021 -0.032
(0.032) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028)
constant -3.54 -3.85 -53.78 -2.72
(0.91) (1.00) (16.6) (0.58)
Number of obs 345 367 367 405
Percentage of Correct Positives 40 40 50 32
Percentage of Correct Negatives 85.8 88.1 87.3 85.5
Psuedo R-squared 0.11 0.091 0.13 0.07
log-likelihood value -68.13 -70.56 -67.18 -87.57
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary indicator for a banking crisis. Marginal effects of variables on the probability of 
a crisis are reported. Robust clustered standard errors are in parentheses. 
See the text for precise definitions of variables.  Positive signifies crisis year. * p-value < 0.1; ** p-value < 0.05; *** p-
value < 0.01 
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Table 7 Fixed Effects Estimations, 1880-1913 
 
Regressors Debt Crises Currency Crises Banking Crises
(1) (2) (3)
Hard currency debt as 0.112 -0.142 0.158
a percentage of total debt (0.095) (0.141) (0.152)
Square of hard currency  -0.127 -0.084 -0.150
debt ratio (0.093) (0.139) (0.152)
Debt/Revenue 0.017*** 0.0001 -0.006
(0.005) (0.008) (0.009)
Mismatch -0.001 0.012 0.027***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
Square of mismatch -0.001*  ---  ---
(0.000)
Growth of terms of trade -0.303 0.716 -0.677
(0.343) (0.577) (0.591)
Trade balance/GDP -0.313* 0.030 0.405
(0.162) (0.279) (0.285)
long term interest rate 0.046*** 0.002 0.006
(0.007) (0.009) (0.009)
Gold standard dummy -0.013 0.004 -0.076*
(0.023) (0.039) (0.039)
Growth of the money supply -0.031 -0.116 0.155
(0.055) (0.087) (0.096)
Gold reserves/notes in circulation 0.040 0.023 0.021
(0.034) (0.059) (0.060)
Consol  0.094*** -0.0001 0.055
(0.026) (0.044) (0.044)
Currency Crisis in t 0.089***  --- 0.077*
(0.027) (0.047)
Currnecy Crisis in t-1 0.034  --- 0.072
(0.029) (0.050)
Banking Crisis in t 0.011 0.041  ---
(0.025) (0.041)
Banking Crisis in t-1 0.043* 0.087**  ---
(0.024) (0.040)
constant -0.322*** 0.103 -0.106
(0.086) (0.151) (0.153)
Number of obs 478 500 496
R-squared 0.1 0.0012 0.01
F-stat 7.86*** 1.23 2.32***
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary indicator for a banking crisis. Estimation is by OLS with 
country indicators. See the text for precise definitions of variables. R-squared 
is the overall R-squared. * p-value < 0.1; ** p-value < 0.05; *** p-value < 0.01 
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Table 8 Fixed Effects Estimations, 1972-1997 
 
Regressors Debt Crises Currency Crises Banking Crises
(1) (2) (3)
Mismatch -0.001 0.057** 0.031
(0.012) (0.025) (0.023)
Debt/Output 0.002*** 0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Trade balance/GDP 0.001 -0.009** -0.005
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Growth of terms of trade  --- -0.001 -0.0006
(0.001) (0.001)
M2 / Reserves  --- -0.0 -0.0001
(0.0004) (0.0003)
G7 average long term interest rate 0.007 0.003 -0.003
(0.005) (0.012) (0.010)
Long-term interest rate 0.004 0.009 0.012
(0.005) (0.011) (0.009)
Pegged exchnage rate regime 0.005 0.047 0.010
(0.025) (0.060) (0.050)
Growth of the money supply  --- 0.00009* 0.00009
(0.00005) (0.0001)
Currency Crisis in t 0.057**  --- -0.016
(0.024) (0.040)
Currnecy Crisis in t-1 0.069***  --- -0.025
(0.023) (0.040)
Banking Crisis in t 0.007 -0.038  ---
(0.027) (0.054)
Banking Crisis in t-1 0.034 0.079  ---
(0.028) (0.056)
constant -0.167*** -0.148 -0.026
(0.045) (0.114) (0.094)
Number of obs 571 491 405
R-squared 0.09 0.05 0.02
F-stat 5.96*** 2.64*** 0.77
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary indicator for a banking crisis. Estimation is by OLS with 
country indicators. See the text for precise definitions of variables. R-squared 
































1880 1890 1900 1910 1880 1890 1900 1910
1880 1890 1900 1910 1880 1890 1900 1910 1880 1890 1900 1910 1880 1890 1900 1910
Argentina Australia Austria Belgium Brazil Canada
Chile Denmark Finland France Germany Greece
India Italy Japan Mexico Netherlands New Zealand
Norway Portugal Russia South Africa Spain Sweden






















































Graphs by country 
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Notes: Data come from Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza (2005)  49 






















































1970-1997  50 
Figure 6 Crisis Frequencies By Country versus the Average Level of Hard Currency 




























Notes: Crisis frequencies are calculated by dividing the number of years in which a 
country experienced a crisis by the total sample years. Both numerator and denominator 
exclude years of ongoing crisis. However, the debt crises series is calculated as the 
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Banking Crises  51 



























Note: Crisis frequencies are calculated by dividing the number of years in which a 
country experienced a crisis by the total sample years. Both numerator and denominator 
exclude years of ongoing crisis. However, alternative debt crises is the percentage of the 
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Alternative Debt Crises  52 
Figure 8 Crisis Frequencies by Country versus the Average Level of the 
“Mismatch” Measure, 1880-1913 
 
 
Notes: The mismatch variable for debt crises uses interest payments. The mismatch for other types of 











































Banking Crises  53 
 
Figure 9 Crisis Frequencies by Country versus the Average Level of the 

































































Alternative Debt Crises  54 
 
Figure 10 Marginal Effect of the Ratio of Hard Currency Debt to Total Debt 
Notes: Figures are calculated based on the model in column 1 of Table 1. Currency crisis 
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Notes: Figures are calculated based on the model in column 1 of Table 1. The 
probabilities are evaluated at the sample means of the control variables with the 
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Currency Crisis at t &
Banking Crisis at t-1
Currency Crisis at t
no currency crisis at t  56 
Figure 12 Predicted Probabilities of a Debt Crisis, 1972-1997. 
 
Notes: Figures are calculated based on the model in column 3 of Table 2. The 
probabilities are evaluated at the sample means of the control variables with the 

























































Currency Crisis at t
no currency crisis at t  57 
 





Notes: The figure shows four bands of countries. They are divided on their GDP 
measures. The first category being all country year observations where real GDP per 
capita is less than $2,900. Low OS means an observation’s average original sin was less 
than or equal to 20 percent. High original sin implies a measure of greater than 20 
percent. All measures on each axis are on the same scale.  Predicted and actual 
probabilities  are based on the 0 to 100 scale. The predicted probabilities come from the 
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Notes: Figures are calculated based on the model in column 3 of Table 6. The 
probabilities are evaluated at the sample means of the control variables with the 
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Note: CC represents currency crises, BC represents banking crises, DC represents debt crises.  61   62 
  1
Table A.2 Crisis Dates 1972-1997  63 
  1
Table A.2 (Continued) Crisis Dates, 1972-1997   64 
Table A.3 Countries in the Estimation Samples 
 
Argentina  Nigeria Argentina Italy 
Australia Norway Australia  Japan
Bangladesh Pakistan Austria Netherlands
Belgium Paraguay Belgium Norway
Brazil Peru Brazil Portugal
Colombia Philippines Canada Russia
Costa Rica Senegal Denmark Spain
Cote D'Ivoire Sri Lanka France Sweden
Canada Spain Germany Switzerland
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